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The "Overnight" Rule in Federal Income
Taxation
SECTION 162 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenve Code of 19541
specifically allows a deduction for travel expenses, including
amounts spent for meals and lodging while the taxpayer is away
from home for business reasons. There are few phrases in federal
income tax law which have been the source of more litigation or
controversy. The dispute with respect to the away from home re-
quirement centers about two questions: Where is the taxpayer's
home so that he may be considered to be away; and how long must
the taxpayer be away from his home in order to come within the
ambit of the deduction provision?
The first question is raised by the statutory language itself, for
in order to determine whether one is away from home, his home
must be located. The same cannot be said with respect to the sec-
ond question because the statute merely states that in order to be
deductible the expense must be incurred while the taxpayer is "away
from home in the pursuit of a trade or business."'  Although this
language does not explicitly raise any question as to the duration
of the taxpayer's absence, the Internal Revenue Service and the Su-
preme Court have imposed the requirement that the taxpayer must
remain away from home overnight. It is the object of this Note
to trace and analyze the judicial and administrative development of
the so-called overnight rule.
I. WHEN IS THE TAXPAYER AwAy FROM HOME?
A. The Tax Home Concept
(1) Where is the Tax Home? -According to the proposed
analysis, the first issue which arises under section 162 (a) (2) is the
location of the taxpayer's home. Because the word is nowhere de-
fined in the statute except with respect to Congressmen,3 its defi-
nition has been left to the administrators and judiciary. According-
ly, both the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court have in-
terpreted home to mean the taxpayer's principal place of business.'
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (2) [hereinafter cited as CODE).
21d.
3 Id. § 162 (a).
4 George W. Lindsay, 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936); Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927);
Rev. Rul. 55-604, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 49; G.C.M. 23,672, 1943 CUM. BULL. 66, 67.
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This definition is based upon the policy that it is undesirable to al-
low a taxpayer to deduct traveling expenses which have resulted
from his deliberate choice to maintain a residence at a distance from
his place of business if such choice is not motivated by business rea-
sons.5 Consistent with this policy, although contrary to the abso-
lute business home rule of the Commissioner, the courts permit a
deduction if the expenses were incurred with respect to distant em-
ployment of a temporary, rather than indefinite, nature,6 or where
the distant employment was required by the nature of the taxpayer's
business.'
(2) The Duplication of Expenses Policy. -The reason for al-
lowing a deduction for traveling expenses incurred while away from
home is to equalize the burden between the taxpayer whose employ-
ment requires business travel and the taxpayer whose employment
does not.' The taxpayer who is away from home for short periods
of time has the burden both of maintaining his home abode and of
meeting the living expenses of his place of employment. It is not
reasonable to expect the employee to dispose of his home every time
the requirements of his employer's business necessitate his being
away for an indefinite period of a few weeks or a few months; hence
a special deduction is allowed to mitigate the burden which this
taxpayer carries.'
Although the duplication of expense rationale is applicable to
lodging expenses, the same would not seem to be true with respect
to meals. The taxpayer whose business requires travel has to eat
whether he is at home or away. If he eats while traveling he ob-
viously does not suffer a simultaneous and similar expense at home
and it would thus appear that the meal expense deduction is actual-
ly a legislative gratuity. However, that gratuity can be justified on
the basis that the in-transit diner must spend more for his meals.
5 Rev. Rul. 55-604, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 49, 50; Cf. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326
U.S. 465 (1946).
6Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944); Coburn v. Commis-
sioner, 138 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1943); E.G. Leach, 12 T.C. 20 (1949); cf. Patricia A.
Ruby Hall, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Memn. 157 (1964); Judy L. Gooderham, 33 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 158 (1964).
7 Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. LeBlanc, 278
F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287 (1967)
(dissenting opinion).
8John J. Harvey, 32 T.C. 1368, 1386 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 283 F.2d
491 (9th Cir. 1960).
9 See James v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 270, 272 (D. Nev. 1959).
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B. The Overnight Rule
(1) Administrative Development. -The Internal Revenue
Service, recently supported by the United States Supreme Court,0
has long maintained that even conceding the fact that the taxpayer
was outside his tax home, he was not away from home unless he
stayed overnight." The statute, however, makes no mention of
such a requirement; section 162(a) of the Code merely provides:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business, including -
(2) .... traveling expenses (including amounts expended for
meals and lodging...) while away from home in the pur-
suit of a trade or business .... 12
Furthermore, it was not until 1958 that the regulations made any
mention of overnight. 3 Even then, as now, the overnight require-
ment did not appear under the discussion in regard to the interpre-
tation of the statute; rather, it appeared in the regulations con-
cerned with the reporting and substantiation of travel expenses.' 4
Because since 1954, transportation expenses, other than for
commuting, have been made expressly deductible regardless of
whether incurred away from home,'5 the relevance of the overnight
test remains only with respect to the deductibility of meal and lodg-
ing expenses. Thus, the taxpayer is not allowed to deduct the travel-
ing expense of meals or lodging - regardless of the distance
traveled - unless he can show that he was away from his tax home
overnight.'
6
C. Judicial Development
When the overnight rule came under judicial scrutiny under the
1939 Code, the courts rejected the overnight requirement with re-
10 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
"Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2 CLu. BULL. 87.
12 CoDE § 162(a).
13 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-17(b) (3) (ii), (b) (4), (c) (2) (1958).
14 Id.
15 CODE § 62(2)(C). The issue still remains, however, whether it represents de-
ductible business transportation or the nondeductible cost of commuting. See Huf-
faker, "Away From Home" as a Tax Concept, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAx. 869,
886-92 (1964).
16 But see notes 19-23 infra & accompanying text (the "need for rest" qualification
engrafted on the rule). The beginning of the rule seems to be I.T. 3395, 1940-2 CuM.
BULL. 64.
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spect to transportation expenses' 7 but upheld the Commissioner with
respect to meals.'
8
(1) The Need for Rest Qualification. -It was not long before
the courts found that a strict application of the overnight rule would
result in injustice to certain classes of taxpayers. The case of David
G. Anderson' involved a railway express employee whose duties
required him to make two consecutive 2-day round trips with a 45-
hour layover between trips. On each trip, the taxpayer would be
released for a period of several hours to eat and rest. During this
released time, Anderson would eat a meal and sleep on a cot in the
baggage car. In holding that the taxpayer was entitled to a deduc-
tion for the meals expense, the court stated:
We think it is too narrow a view of the facts not to regard both
round trips as overnight trips. Furthermore, it was necessary for
the petitioner to obtain rest at the end of the outbound trip before
starting upon the return run. We believe too, that the determina-
tion of the question should not depend upon the length of the rest
period. The round trips required 16 and 18 hours, during which
a rest period was necessary.20
The Commissioner accordingly relaxed the rigidity of his over-
night test to accommodate the need-for-rest qualification which the
Anderson2' court made applicable to carrier employees. A new
rule was drafted which stated that in order to qualify for the deduc-
tion, the taxpayer must be away "for a period which is substantially
longer than an ordinary day's work and of sufficient length to neces-
sitate relief from duty to obtain sleep."' To this ruling was added
the impact of Williams v. Patterson in which the court maintained
that an elderly railroad conductor was entitled to a meals and lodg-
ing deduction for expenses incurred during a 6-hour midday lay-
over period despite the fact that such expenses were incurred merely
for the convenience of the taxpayer. Although the Commissioner
acquiesced in the Patterson case, he cautioned that with respect to
meals, the brief interval an employee was released for the purpose
'7 Chandler v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1955); Scott v. Kelm, 110
F. Supp. 819 (D.C. Minn. 1953); Joseph M. Winn, 32 T.C. 220 (1959); Podems, 24
T.C. 21 (1955); Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949).
18 AI J. Smith, 33 T.C. 861 (1960); Sam J. Herrin, 28 T.C. 1303 (1957); Fred
Marion Osteen, 14 T.C. 1261 (1950).
19 18 T.C. 649 (1952).
201d. at 653.
21 The Commissioner acquiesced in the decision. 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 1.
2 2 Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 75.
23 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
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of eating rather than sleeping did not constitute an adequate rest
period.'
(2) Complete Rejection of the Overnight Requirement. -Un-
der the Anderson and Patterson cases except for taxpayers such as
truckdrivers, railroad conductors, or other long-distance delivery
men, the deductibility of meal expenses incurred while traveling still
depended on whether the taxpayer procured lodging and stayed over-
night. This last vestige of the overnight rule was rejected by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hanson v. Commissioner" which
involved a taxpayer who supervised work at various job sites 6 to 80
miles away from his place of business. On many of these trips he
returned home the same day although at times he was away over-
night. Reversing the Tax Court, the court of appeals permitted the
deduction of meal expenses on the 1-day trips emphasizing the busi-
ness necessity for the taxpayer's travel to areas away from his home
city.2 6
Despite the fact that the Commissioner did not acquiesce in the
Hanson case," the Tax Court decided to follow it and in William
A. Bagley8 permitted the deduction of meal expenses incurred on
1-day trips by a consulting engineer traveling from 30 to 75 miles
from home. The court picked flexibility over rigidity and implied
that each case was to be decided on its facts? but evidence of dis-
agreement and confusion was demonstrated by the lack of unanimity
as to the proper basis for the Tax Court decision."
When Bagley reached the First Circuit Court of Appeals, it was
reversed.31 In a thoughtful analysis of the issues the court of ap-
peals denied the deductibility of meal expenses incurred on 1-day
trips. This result, the court felt, was necessary to prevent the dis-
criminatory treatment of commuters.
(3) The Issue Reaches the Supreme Court, -While the Bag-
ley case was in the courts, the Commissioner had without success
continued to litigate the issue. In Correll v. United States," the
24 Rev. Rul. 61-221, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 34.
25298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962), vonaxquiesced in, Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2
CUM. BULL. 87.
261d. at 393.
27 Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 87.
28 46 T.C. 176 (1966), revd, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
29 Id. at 183.
30 There were concurring opinions by Judges Turner, Mulroney, and Simpson and
a dissent without opinion by Judge Whitney.
31374 .2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
32 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966), ree'd, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
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Sixth Circuit had rejected the overnight rule and allowed a meal
expense deduction to a traveling salesman who always returned
home at night. The First Circuit's decision in Bagley thus created
a conflict in the circuits and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Correll33
In a 5 to 3 decision the Court sustained the Commissioner's
need-for-rest rule.34 The Court's decision not only ended a long
period of controversy on the question, but stopped a judicial trend
which threatened the final demise of the long-standing administra-
tive ruling.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE IRULE
A. The Legislative History
The legislative materials in connection with the statutory de-
velopment of travel expense deductions shed little light upon the
congressional intent with respect to the overnight requirement.35
The Supreme Court nevertheless felt in Correll that because the
33 388 U.S. 905 (1967).
34 389 U.S. 299 (1967) (Justice Marshall not participating).
35The life of the traveling expense deduction began in 1913 when the Revenue
Act of that year provided for the deduction of "necessary expenses actually paid in
carrying on any business, not including personal, living, or family expenses." Revenue
Act of 1913, ch. 16, § I1B, 38 Star. 167. This statute was followed by the Revenue
Act of 1918 which allowed a deduction for "all ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred.., in carrying on any trade or business ... ," Revenue Act of 1918, ch.
18, § 214(a), 40 Star. 1066, without again making any specific mention of traveling
expenses. Shortly, the first administrative pronouncement appeared on that specific
subject. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 292 (1919). It is notable that the first regulation under
the statute allowed no deduction for meals or lodging although it did provide that
transportation expenses were deductible.
In 1920, T.D. 3101, 3 CuM. BULL. 191 (1920), expressed a different and more
equitable administrative policy with respect to meals. One who has to travel for a
living incurs meal expenses in excess of that of the taxpayer who eats at home. To
allow the traveler a deduction for the total amount expended would not be fair to his
"stay at home" counterpart who could deduct nothing. If the deduction were allowed
only to the extent of the amounts in excess of what it would normally cost to sleep and
eat at home, both taxpayers would be on relatively equal footing. That was the pre-
cise allowance permitted by the Treasury. Id.
The first statutory enactment with respect to travel expenses came with the Revenue
Act of 1921 which amended section 214 of the 1918 Act by providing specifically for
a deduction for "traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals
and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business." Revenue
Act of 1921, ch. 136, 5 21 4 (a)(1), 42 Stat. 339 (emphasis added). It will be noticed
that the statutory language, by allowing a deduction for the entire amount, specifically
rejected the Treasury's previous pro rata approach. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1921). This language was then reproduced in section 2 3(a)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and remained intact in section 162 of the 1954 Code.
Moreover, the concept of adjusted gross income was broadened in the 1954 Code to
permit a deduction of unreimbursed transportation expenses.
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statutory language had been carried forward unchanged from pre-
vious enactments, congressional consent to the existing rule was
implied.36
This conclusion, however, is not well supported. A statement
in the Senate Finance Committee report with respect to the enact-
ment of the 1954 adjusted gross income provision for transporta-
tion expenses stated: "At present, business transportation expenses
can be deducted by an employee in arriving at adjusted gross income
only if they are re-imbursed by the employer or if they are incurred
while he was away from home overnight."" The Service contends
that the 1954 enactment took place with "clear recognition of the
'overnight' rule" by Congress.!' However, this conclusion is suspect
in light of the fact that the same report at another point makes no
reference to the overnight requirement while discussing expenses
away from home. 9  Other sources are no more conclusive. A re-
quest to allow a meal expense deduction on 1-day trips was made
during congressional hearings on the 1939 Code revision.4" How-
ever, the Treasury itself suggested alternatives to the overnight
rule.4
1
B. Possible Alternatives
The opinion of the Court in the Correll case, although forcibly
written, nevertheless gave some indication that the result might have
been otherwise had there been a reasonable alternative.'
Many alternatives had been offered by the courts because judi-
cial antagonism to the rule had been especially strong when, under
the 1939 Code, the overnight requirement applied not only to
the deductibility of meal expenses but transportation expenses as
well.4
3
(1) "Clear Words of the Statute." -- One alternative to the
overnight rule is the plain meaning rule of statutory construction
36 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
37 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1954).38 Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 87, 88.
39 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1954).
40 Hearings on General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 216-19 (1953); Hearings on
H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 2396
(1954).
43 Hearings on the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 98 (1963).
42 389 U.S. at 303 n.14, 306.
43 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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which dictates that "away from home" can not mean "away from
home overnight."44  If that had been the congressional intent, the
extra word would have been inserted in the statute. While it may
not be disputed that the plain meaning rule is far from conclusive
it nevertheless is a starting point and one which should govern un-
less there is evidence that a different meaning was intended by the
legislature.45 In Correll, the Supreme Court found such evidence
because it felt the words of the statute were ambiguous. In its opin-
ion, the phrase "traveling away from home" required statutory con-
struction because "[tihe very concept of 'traveling' obviously re-
quires physical separation from one's home. To read the phrase
'away from home...' literally, would render the phrase completely
redundant."4"
(2) Compromise Approaches. -There have been additional
approaches proposed which attempt to reach a compromise between
the Commissioner's relatively narrow sleep or rest standard and the
rather broad standard of the plain meaning rule. Some of these
tests were formulated with regard to the deductibility of transporta-
tion expenses under the 1939 Code when the overnight requirement
also applied to transportation expenses and, before Correll, could
have been considered as applicable to meal expense deductions un-
der the 1954 Code.
(a) The Distance Test. -- One such compromise is the so-
called distance test,47 according to which the words "while away
from home" are not to be taken in their literal sense. Whether the
taxpayer will be allowed a deduction for meals consumed during
his travel will depend on how far he is away from his home. What
distance will suffice is to be a question of reasonableness. Thus, in
Amoroso v. Commissioner,48 the First Circuit Court of Appeals sus-
tained the Tax Court's determination that expenditures made for
meals consumed in the greater Boston area by a taxpayer who re-
sided 10 miles away in Milton, were not deductible. The court
concluded that the meals had been purchased within a reasonable
44 See Hanson v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 1962); Scott v. Kelm,
110 F. Supp. 819, 821-22 (D. Minn. 1953); Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414, 416-17
(1949).
45 "[The words of statutes - including revenue acts - should be interpreted
where possible in their ordinary, everyday sense." Hanover Bank v. Commissioner,
369 U.S. 672, 687 (1962); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1946).
46 See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 304 n.19 (1967).
47 See Amoroso v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 583, 585 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 926 (1952); cf. Chandler v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 467, 470 (1st Cir. 1955).
48 193 F.2d 583 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 926 (1952).
1068
THE "OVERNIGHT" RULE
radius of the taxpayer's home. On the other hand, the same court,
in Chandler v. Commissioner,49 held that automobile expenses in-
curred in a 37-mile trip were incurred at a distance sufficiently re-
mote to qualify as "away from home" and therefore were deductible.
(b) The Daily Routine Test. -An additional alternative to
the rigid overnight test was applied by the Tax Court to deny a de-
duction for meals consumed on the road if the taxpayer's travel was
a matter of daily routine.5" This approach prevents the deductibil-
ity of meal expenses eaten away from home for all those taxpayers
whose business or employment requires long-distance daily travel
but which is uninterrupted for any substantial rest or layover period.
Common fact situations involve the traveling salesman or manufac-
turer's representative, and long-distance deliverymen and carrier em-
ployees engaged in so-called turnaround runs. The Tax Court
viewed such taxpayer as no different than the factory worker who
is unable to have one of his meals at home.5
It should be noted, however, that while the daily routine ap-
proach has been discussed and suggested as an alternative test for
the deductibility of meals expenses,52 an examination of the cases in
which it has been applied reveals that the Tax Court has not used
it as such. Rather, the daily routine argument has been used in a
negative sense to rationalize the denial of the meal deduction. If
any test is going to be useful to the taxpayer or his representative,
it must set forward standards from which it can be determined with
reasonable certainty when an expense is or is not deductible.
(c) The Extra Services Test. -In contrast to the daily routine
test, the Tax Court had, on several occasions under the 1939 Code,
allowed an automobile expense deduction to an employee for non-
overnight travel undertaken "in connection with" the performance
of his services as an employee and not "solely in the performance of
such services."53
Although this language is hardly a model of clarity, it means
that while a taxpayer may not be allowed a traveling expense for
that travel which is part of his daily routine, he will be allowed such
49 226 F.2d 467, 470 (1st Cir. 1955).
50 E.g., Jerome Mortrud, 44 T.C. 208 (1965); Fred G. Armstrong, 43 T.C. 733
(1965). See also Fred Marion Osteen, 14 T.C. 1261 (1950).
51See Fred G. Armstrong, 43 T.C. 733, 735 (1965); Charles H. Hyslope, 21 T.C.
131, 134 (1953); Fred Marion Osteen, 14 T.C. 1261, 1262 (1950).
52 See Comment, Deductibility of Business Expenses - The "Away from Home"
Clause, 11 ST. Louis LJ. 83, 91 (1966).
53 Joseph X. Winn, 32 T.C. 220, 224 (1959) (emphasis added); see Irene L. Bell,
13 T.C. 344,349 (1959); Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414,417 (1949).
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a deduction for trips which are in the nature of extra services to the
employer. An example is the case of an employee or agent who
makes a weekly or monthly trip to report to his employer in a
distant city. 4
(d) Conclusion. -The infirmity in the compromise ap-
proaches to the overnight problem lies in their flexibility. A de-
termination of what constitutes an unreasonable distance or an ex-
traordinary trip or whether the taxpayer is engaging in daily routine
travel, is likely to promote litigation and requires a "case by case"
approach. The uncertainty inherent in such determinations is un-
desirable in the field of taxation especially when it is realized that
the meal expense deduction affects a substantial number of taxpay-
ers.
C. Arguments Supporting the Correll Decision
In addition to the fact that the overnight or sleep or rest re-
quirement provides a certain demarcation line between the deducti-
bility or nondeductibility of meal expenses incurred in travel, both
the Supreme Court in United States v. Correll5' and the First Circuit
in Commissioner v. Bagley5" based their decisions on traditional
arguments offered in support of the Service's position.
(1) The Rule as a Matter of Statutory Construction. -It is
contended that the rule is required as a matter of statutory construc-
tion. Section 162(a) (2) refers to meals and lodging as a group.
The phrase has so been used throughout its statutory and administra-
tive history.57 The linking of meals and lodging in the statute indi-
cates, according to this analysis, that the meal expense is only de-
ductible when incurred in conjunction with lodging."
As a matter of logic, this conclusion is vulnerable because one
may equally well contend that the lodging expense is not deductible
unless associated with meals. Furthermore, it is not true that the
two terms have always been used together. Meals and lodging are
used conjunctively in section 162, but under the adjusted gross in-
come provisions, section 62 of the Code, they are separated; section
54 See, e.g., Joseph M. Winn, 32 T.C. 220 (1959); Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414
(1949).
55 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
56 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
57 See § 21 4 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Star. 339; T.D. 3101, 3 Cum.
BULL. 191 (1920). See also O.D. 864, 4 CuM. BULL. 211-12 (1921).
5 8 See Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204, 207 n.10 (1st Cir. 1967); cf. Woof-
ford v. Hooper, 149 Tenn. 250, 259 S.W. 549 (1924).
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62(2) (B) allows a deduction for expenses of "travel, meals, and
lodging," whereas section 162 (a) (2) allows a business deduction
for "amounts expended for meals and lodging." If a deduction is
allowed for lodging associated with business travel, there is nothing
in the statute to deny the deduction of meal expenses associated
with business travel but unassociated with lodging.
To this argument it is answered that the statute allows a deduc-
tion only for those expenses incurred while away from home and
one is not away from home within the statutory language unless he
requires lodging. Such a reply merely begs the question and one
is led to the conclusion that it is simply not possible to resolve the
issue solely on the basis of the statutory language.
(2) A Matter of Judicial Choice. -Because the statutory con-
struction arguments for and against the overnight rule are equally
unconvincing on both sides, the Supreme Court essentially resolved
the issue by making what it felt was the most equitable choice.
Writing for the Court, in Correll Justice Stewart said:
The sleep or rest rule avoids the obvious iniquity of permitting
the New Yorker who makes a quick trip to Washington and back,
missing neither his breakfast nor his dinner at home, to deduct the
cost of his lunch merely because he covers more miles than the
salesman who travels locally and must finance all his meals without
the help of the Federal Treasury.59
The Commissioner's strict overnight rule thus places all 1-day travel-
ers, including the commuter, on equal footing regardless of the num-
ber of miles covered or the amount of time spent in travel.
Ill. CONCLUSION
The lack of legislative materials leave the overnight issue with-
out the primary source upon which it should be resolved. Further-
more, the weakness of the arguments offered in support of the rule
and having a foundation in the statutory language6' adds little to
the case for the sleep or rest requirement. However, because the
administrators and courts are required to determine when travel and
meal expenses are deductible and because the overwhelming prac-
tice has been to deny the deduction of commuting expenses, travel
and otherwise, the question still remains: How does one determine
whether a taxpayer has incurred business expenses away from home?
Judicial alternatives have been examined6 but upon analysis seem to
59 389 U.S. at 303-04.00 See notes 57-59 supra & accompanying text.
61 See text accompanying notes 46-55 supra.
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be undesirable because they are not capable of drawing guidelines
sufficiently definite to permit a clear answer to the question. Ad-
ministrative alternatives, although equitable, have proven too dif-
ficult to administer. 2 Thus, whether the overnight rule is the most
desirable administrative and judicial answer would seem to depend
on whether it is commensurate with the policy which is the founda-
tion of the travel expense deduction.63 Despite its illogical nature,
it would seem that the sleep or rest requirement best meets this test.
As the court stated in Commissioner v. Bagley,64 "We believe that
fairness to the greatest number of people, and at the same time a
practical administrative approach ... is to accept the Commission-
er's sleep or rest rule."'6 5
In conclusion, it seems strange that the legislature at no time
chose to remedy what was clearly a serious drafting error. Through-
out the enactments and reenactments of the travel expense statute a
word or sentence could have dearly expressed the congressional
policy thereby eliminating the judicial and administrative dilemma.
MAMo C. CIANO
62 See note 35 supra.
63 See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
64 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
65 Id. at 207.
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